This paper prises open the black box of the social impact bond (SIB), the novel financial instrument at the heart of social investment. We discover that concrete information is currently limited and our method is thus more speculative. We address the obfuscation of the nomenclature of the instrument, and explore the mechanics of SIBs to suggest that they are not simple bonds but rather also bear properties akin to those associated with derivative contracts. We speculate on possible developments of the market in these bonds by considering the history of some previous financial innovations, namely CDOs underpinned by microfinance loans and the short-lived Policy Analysis Market. Our discussion leads us to reevaluate Goodhart's law and the ways in which it operates in relation to SIBs. We conclude by suggesting that SIBs inherent indifference to the underlying state of the world renders them ultimately unlikely to delivery improvements in public services. 
1 But a social impact bond is not, in fact, a bond -at least not a conventional bond (Warner, 2013) . As we noted above, a distinguishing characteristic of a SIB is the dependence of its financial performance on the performance of an underlying activity funded by the bond. Of course, a variant of this relationship pertains in any bond. But in the case of UK gilts, say, or other government or corporate bonds, the dimension of performance is a strictly etiolated one. Except in the case of default, repayment of principal and predetermined interest payments will be made at predetermined dates.
For Arena, Bengo, Calderini & Chiodo (2016, p. 928) , drawing on Bolton & Savell (2010), Liebman (2011) and Warner (2013) , SIBs "can be better defined as hybrid instruments with elements of both equity and debt". We would go further and contend that key aspects of the social impact bond are better understood by viewing it as a derivative instrument, since it has "a value deriving from an underlying variable" (OED). Or as Investopedia.com puts it:
A derivative is a security with a price that is dependent upon or derived from one or more underlying assets. The derivative itself is a contract between two or more parties based upon the asset or assets.
The underlying variable or "asset" in this case being the performance of the service provider against the set of metrics that measure the success of the intervention funded by the SIB.
This derivative instrument-like quality of the SIB is worth stressing; it is not a mere matter of semantics or labels. The SIB is similar to debt or equity in that the owner's investment makes possible the project. But the owner of both equity and debt has a claim on the underlying asset itself. This is obvious in the case of equity: its owner literally owns a share of the company or corporation and, at least in principle, has a say (proportionate to their share) in the way the corporation is run. With debt (a corporate bond, say) the holder does not formally own any part of the corporation, but in the event of default then this bond holder does in fact have a claim to the corporation's concrete underlying property -physical, intellectual and so on -and, indeed, the bond holder's claim legally precedes that of the equity holder. The holder of a social impact bond, by contrast, enjoys no such claim. If the intervention their "investment" is financing is unsuccessful (i.e. it fails to meet its pre-defined performance targets -for that is the only measure of success that counts) then they have no claim to any asset of the failed service provider. To repeat: their stake is in the performance of the service providing company only, not in the company itself.
Barriers to Realization
Given the complexity of social impact bonds (and the difficulty of managing risk), it is difficult to discern with any certainty how the market might develop. However, for any significant expansion and development to occur considerable information is necessary to enable investors to take informed and secure choices about where to place their bets. A putative player in the social investment market requires an additional layer of information beyond that pertaining in conventional financial markets, such as those for equities, bonds or foreign exchange. Specifically, what is required is information on what level of performance the service provider has delivered on, for the bond's payout (or lack thereof) is determined by this. Obtaining such information entails the additional costs of surveying, interpreting and formally authorizing an "objective" level of performance -or in dealing with the costs of contestation if no agreed "objective" view of performance is available. The cleanest way of achieving the former, more desirable, outcome is to have actual performance assessed or audited by a third party -or, in fact, a fourth party, since the SIB already involves three parties with a "stake" in the performance attained. Of course it is this additional step that enables the bond to parade as deliverer of social impact. But, we would speculate, the complexification of the transaction entailed has significant impact upon the capacity of the bond to be marketized and thus may also impact upon the capacity of this set up to afford easy access to the $45 trillion of capital that is apparently seeking to be invested impactfully.
A major informational lacuna around SIBs is that underpinning PbR contracts are rarely if ever fully disclosed, as we discuss below with reference to the Peterborough SIB, and that elements of "performance" measurement vary between studies and interventions. This can be the outcome of SIB commissioning agents applying different ratios and techniques for estimating the "point" of intervention and applying different discount rates (Cooper et al., 2016) , or randomized control trial methodology (Neyland, 2017; Tse & Warner, 2017) , which makes comparisons between different SIBs applying different techniques challenging. However, the creation of a central costing system could mitigate the problem of comparability across SIBs regarding the valuation of social problems.
In fact, since 2014 it has been possible to develop social impact bonds in the UK with reference to a Unit Cost Database. Developed by the Manchester-based policy thinktank New Economy, in conjunction with the national government, this database is an attempt to standardize the costs and monetary benefits associated with specific social problems and their amelioration and thus to ensure a degree of consistency in rendering more positive social outcomes and their associated costs of delivery. This relative dearth of information leaves us in something a difficult position. We thus propose advancing our speculations by looking at the development of markets and instruments that bear similarities to the attributes of those we might expect to find in the social impact arena, beginning with the market in microfinance.
Previous Attempts to Do Well and Do Good
The first Microcredit Summit was held in Washington, D.C. in 1997. There more than 2000 officials from 137 countries pledged their commitment to combating poverty by making finance available to some of the world's poorest people. They agreed to provide political and financial support to the further development of microfinance institutions (MFIs), recognizing the major part such institutions can play in the eradication of poverty. With such a clear goal in mind, and with most existing MFIs organized as non-profits, the result was the maintenance of, on the whole, coherent policies within those institutions. Typically, MFIs avoided charging high interest rate, did not seek to maximize returns and displayed flexibility in their pricing and lending policies. More recently, however, capital for microfinance institutions provided through non-profit and governmental sources has been supplemented and even supplanted by that drawn from global capital markets on commercial terms.
We draw on an insider's account of a system of rating MFIs published just before the Global microfinance institutions. These share the same basic structure as the "toxic assets" of pooled "subprime" mortgages and, just as those CDOs needed ratings of risk and reward (no matter how spurious they subsequently proved) to enable their marketing and sale, so too did these agglomerated loans to microfinance institutions. 4 Their system demands, for the best ratings: an 4 Our use of somewhat cynical language to describe CDOs is both deliberate and far from constrained to avowedly critically oriented commentary, as the ubiquity of the term 'toxic assets' in international press from 2008 onwards attests. Collateralized Debt Obligations have, of course, been used to 'pool' all types of debt. But their increasing ubiquity should not lead us to assume they are therefore benign, as the similarly increasing ubiquity of the notion of 'toxic assets' reminds us. Indeed we would contend that their association with the subprime crisis is not necessarily a particularly aberrant instance of their use. There are several characteristics of securitization -the process through which a CDO is created -that are germane to our discussion and which, we suggest, apply to both the US mortgage market and, potentially, the social investment market. First, securitization involves a further separation between the 'performance' of some underlying activity or asset and the actors who benefit financially from this performance. This creates principal-agent problems related to the monitoring of this underlying performance -or portfolio of performances. Second, an often-implicit assumption associated with the CDO is that the performances of the underlying activities or assets are uncorrelated. This assumption clearly proved to be false in the case of "efficient" loan portfolio; profitability; sustainability; effective management policies and reporting; strong operational procedures; and tight internal control. In evaluating a strictly commercial organization these might, indeed, be sensible criteria. But let's look at how this plays out in relation to microfinance. Stanley, suggests that this can be compensated for by charging high interest rates (ibid.). Now, it might appear demanding extremely high interest repayments from some of the world's poorest people is an unusual way of alleviating poverty, but microfinance's goals are also subverted in a second way. High interest rates will eventually decrease demand so that only those people who can pay higher interest will take up loans. And, in particular, those with riskier enterprises, if they are also projecting higher returns, will be given loans at the expense of poorer borrowers. Similarly, the law of diminishing returns suggests that entrepreneurs employing less capital can make higher returns and are thus able to pay higher interest charges. Here we witness the price paid in terms of loss of uniqueness and specific fit when commensurability is engineered and a market made.
Counting the Costs of Complexification in Context
Although there are considerable differences between the more mature market in microfinance and the thus far small and emergent market in SIBs, there are potentially significant similarities in terms of how underlying financing of these mechanisms might develop. We can see evidence of desires to pool SIB instruments on investment platforms, which hold out the promise of both managing costs more effectively and disciplining providers via market reallocation. However, if such a trajectory were to take hold there would also be substantial risks of the same sort of mission or purpose drift that we witnessed in the collateralization of mortgages and microfinance wherein the same etiolation of relation to underlying activity that enables disciplining can act to produce a market which has shifted considerably in terms of its putative beneficiaries.
In the case of mortgage-backed or -pooled securities within microfinance, supporting financial mechanisms are typically designed to draw customers further into cycles of debt and borrowing, such as in US sub-prime markets for example (Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, & Vig, 2010) . In so doing, households become increasingly precarious, with their holding of illiquid assets in a sea of liquid exchange forcing them to act as involuntary "shock absorbers" for broader system risk (Bryan & Rafferty, 2014, p. 891) . This process owes much to the transfer of risk from global financial markets to individuals and into various aspects of everyday life (Bryan & Rafferty, 2006 . Social life becomes subject to the traditional investment logic of finance in which higher returns are offered as compensation for increased risk, enabling specific aspects of everyday life to generate increased reward for investors. And this subjection to finance plays out at a variety of scales. Roy (2010), for example, marshals ample evidence of the way in which (commercialized) microfinance became the preferred development tool of powerful global institutions, such as the World Bank and the US State Department, in effect becoming a part of the Washington consensus. On the ground, as Hina (2013) notes in the case of Pakistan, when institutions move towards commercial borrowing as their prime source of underlying finance, interest rates charged to end borrowers of microfinance tend to increase. The unpleasant corollary here is that such a model of microfinance has resulted in the redistribution of wealth from some of the poorest people in the world to some of the richest (remarkably, in a way that can be, and often is, described as Responsible Investment). Another case of what Joseph Stiglitz has repeatedly described as "money flowing uphill".
The same financially-biased perversion attention to the urban environment and the performance of its constituents may be seen in the construction and issuance of SIBs. In Cooper et al. (2016) , for instance, the SIB was designed to alleviate homelessness and recidivism but they note that it is not the most vulnerable that become principal targets for intervention. Rather it is those homeless groups and individuals that possess the greatest capacities to engage in transformation of circumstances, with the greatest capacity to generate wealth for bond holders.
In such circumstances there is little reason to expect the financial performance of an impact bond to effect substantive and desirable societal change or urban growth in the round. Cities and the urban environment have experienced the most significant damage since the financial crisis (Oosterlynck & Gonzalez, 2013) , where, in the UK at least, council budgets have been particularly slashed, devastating local economies (Gonzalez & Oosterlynck, 2014) . Since SIBs offer opportunities to councils to access new areas of funding 6 there is likely to be inter-local competition -perhaps stretching to a law of the jungle (Peck & Tickell, 2002) -between councils as they compete to host these investment vehicles. This, in the context of post-crisis urban governance, is likely to increase current conditions of urban poverty and promote a race to the bottom as councils turn their attention to the derivative promises of SIBs in the face of few, if any, substantive funding alternatives.
Financialization of governance at the local and supralocal levels engenders more business-like operation, resulting in a keen eye being placed on seizing financial opportunities to overcome the monetary and budgetary limits imposed by central government (Gonzalez & Oosterlynck, 2014; Leach & Roberts, 2011) . Within this set-up social and urban interventions, such as family support, are outsourced to private service provides, while basic council services become offered at basic and premium rates (Leach & Roberts, 2011) . This, in itself, produces increased complexity for governance as service providers and local councils clash over responsibility for monitoring results (Neyland, 2017) . The underpinning neoliberal logic of SIBs (Dowling, 2016; Harvie, forthcoming; Harvie & Ogman, forthcoming) is likely to intensify this change -at least extant studies demonstrably point to this (Cooper et al., 2016, p.66; Mitchell, 2017; Warner, 2015) -and produce more confusion at the local level regarding the governance and accountability of contracted services within the SIB. This is in large part because they introduce a yet further layer of complexification around the disputability of performance that is a matter of pecuniary interest for not only providers and commissioning agents but also an additional and distinct stakeholder group, the investors in the social impact "bonds". Gilts and real bonds, due to their lack of hypothecation and the level of agglomeration at which they operate, do not transform governance in the same ways.
Hence, across the examples raised, the range of actors and financial participants increase through issuance of SIBs, which raises the complexity of finance at the local level (Warner, 2013), particularly as the role of the state and local councils become squeezed in the turn towards impact investment (Mitchell, 2017) . This renders state interests as just another stakeholder in the function of local governance, eroding the structures of policy-making and accountability and increasing the institutional web of local change actors. The arrangement sees the responsibility for regulation also diluted to include private impact investors and social finance intermediaries.
Intelligent Design?
If the SIB is at least partly a derivative, then it is a derivative of a particular sort. Specifically, its underlying variable is not some pre-existing asset value or measure of performance, as in the case of derivatives based on commodity or currency prices. Rather this underlying variable has been explicitly and deliberately designed for an instrumental purpose, as in the case of financial instruments derived from weather "events". Darkly entertaining similar beasts are the contracts that were to be traded on the very short-lived Policy Analysis Market that existed for a matter of hours in July 2003.
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The Policy Analysis Market is an example of a particular market technology known as "information markets", "ideas futures" or "prediction markets", with the three terms typically used interchangeably. According to Berg, Nelson & Rietz (2003, p. 3):
"Prediction markets" are designed and conducted for the primary purpose of aggregating information so that market prices forecast future events. These markets differ from typical, naturally occurring markets in their primary role as a forecasting tool instead of a resource allocation mechanism.
PAM's predictions were to emerge from enabling speculation on an avowedly instrumentally designed market on such then possible future occurrences as the overthrow of the King of Jordan, a
North Korean missile attack, the persistence of the Iraqi regime and US recognition of Palestine, each by a pre-specified date. One would also have been able to bet on combinations of events such as these, and it was in these combinatorial bets that PAM's greatest predictive power resided, at least according to its zealots. Take the examples of the possibility of the overthrow Abdullah II, an event in which a specialist in Jordanian domestic affairs might feel comfortable taking a position, and a contract linked to the ability of Sadaam's regime to survive more than one month of hostilities, which a specialist in US military planning and operational capabilities might be comfortable trading.
Others, however, were less convinced. Mason Richey (2005) follows the logic of PAM to its selfdefeating terminal conclusion. As he notes, traders purchase a contract on PAM if they think its underlying event is more likely than its current price would suggest. En masse, such trading raises the price of that contract. But PAM is an information and prediction market. Its raison d'être is to provide a signal to those who are interested in the occurrence, or rather the prevention, of the events that underlie traded contracts. Thus a rise in prices is likely to instigate a response from those for whom the market was created as signaling mechanism. In turn this thus reduces the likelihood of the occurrence of the event. I bet, you see I bet, you act, I lose. Or as Richey puts it: "The idea that government authorities employ the market to foresee events that they will prevent would, a priori, mute the signal" (2005, p. 10). But this is not the most fundamental of the flaws. It merely reflects one of a deeper level. For in the act of specification of the possible future, the job that the signaling market of derivatives is intended to achieve is already done. In the case of PAM, again in Richey's (2005, p. 10) words:
[T]he derivatives of maximal predictive interest, the impetus for the system's design, terrorism derivatives, must be explicitly articulated in order to be offered. But if the market designers can list a specific terrorist event, then they have already defined, determined, and predicted the very event that the market is designed to identify. If the market designers know which terrorist derivatives to offer, then they have already done the work of the market.
For Richey then: "The system does both too little and too much" (2005, p. 10). Might something similar hold with the SIB? Let's try to make the comparison a little more specific. As several scholars make clear (Harvie & Ogman, forthcoming; McHugh et al., 2013; Mitropolous & Bryan, 2015) policy analysis, the "market" is mere sideshow, Richey's "too little". The "market" in PAM's case merely trades those contracts that have already been set up and designed by the market's implementers. With SIBs and the "social investment market", the "market" is, at least thus far, notable only by its absence: the design work rests solely with the interactions between the commissioning agent, service providers and, in some cases, investors -and, of course,
"intermediaries" such as Social Finance, which frequently double-up as evangelists. In such a set-up, all we see is a contracting arrangement with some bells and whistles attached, none of which appear tradeable in any market that we can at present discern. Indeed, it is perhaps of little surprise in this context that the third cohort of prisoners to benefit from the HMP Peterborough bond's provision ended up receiving their assistance via a contracted scheme when the SIB was brought prematurely to a close! What then of the "too much"? In relation to PAM, this was the inappropriate way, in relation to pretty much all gambling codes and legal frameworks the world over, that the counter-party to your bet could act on the information contained in your bet to reduce the likelihood of the occurrence that you had placed your wager upon. In relation to SIBs, it is the construction of the metrics that determine investors' payouts that does too much.
Unintended consequences in the form of distorted activity… can result from perverse incentives which lead… entities away from activities that are most needed towards activities that are most measurable. (McHugh et al., 2013, p. 7) This distortion is an instance of a variant or derivation of Goodhart's law, named after the British economist, Charles Goodhart. Goodhart's (1975) original formulation -"Any observed statistical regularity will tend to collapse once pressure is placed upon it for control purposes" -was intended as a critique of emerging Thatcherite monetarist policy. Its purchase is considerably broadened by its more usual contemporary rendering as "any measure that becomes a target ceases to be a useful measure". Some commentators, including Marilyn Strathern (1999) and Keith Hoskin (1996) , go still further, suggesting not only that measures that become targets cease to be useful measures but also that any measure introduced into an environment seems destined to become a target and thus useless as a measure, regardless of the intent behind its original introduction into that environment.
Such drift is exactly what we witnessed above in our account of the development of a market in microfinance from support for poorer members of society towards those more able to demonstrate their capacity to deliver a return on the projects for which the investment is sought. Indeed evidence from SIBs aimed to reduce recidivism in the UK appear to bear this out (Cooper et al., 2016; Golka, 2016) . Cooper et al.'s (2016) case noted tensions between investor representatives and serviceproviders wherein those on the frontline of delivery were deliberately kept ignorant of some outcome metrics -a clear case of intentional dulling, on the part of the service provider, of the
